Introduction

World attention turned to Shenzhen, China, in November 2026 as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit raised the prospect of a rare trilateral gathering involving U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In an opinion piece published by Al Jazeera, scholars Peter Kuznick and Ivana Nikolić Hughes argue that such a meeting could revive the ambition of nuclear disarmament last seriously pursued by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev during their 1986 summit in Reykjavik. The authors frame the moment as a potential turning point for an era defined by atomic weapons.

What Happened

According to the article, excitement surrounded the possibility that the three leaders would meet on the sidelines of the November 18–19 APEC summit. Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin is cited as saying a trilateral session focused on denuclearization would be logical, particularly as part of broader diplomacy involving Iran and the United States.

The piece traces the idea back to Reykjavik in 1986, where Reagan and Gorbachev came close to agreeing on the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. That opportunity collapsed, the authors write, because Reagan refused to confine testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative to a laboratory setting for a decade.

More recent positions are also reviewed. Trump has questioned the cost and logic of building new warheads, while Putin has previously affirmed Russia’s interest in universal disarmament. Xi, speaking at the United Nations in 2017, called for nuclear weapons to be prohibited and eventually destroyed, though Beijing has since linked arms control talks to reductions by Washington and Moscow.

Still, significant hurdles remain. The authors note Trump’s appointment of Stephen Miller as chief of staff following Republican midterm losses, Putin’s reliance on the world’s largest nuclear stockpile, and China’s ongoing arsenal expansion as complicating factors.

Why This Matters

The stakes are existential. The authors remind readers that the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom once jointly declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, while reaffirming their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. That declaration predated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent nuclear rhetoric, but it still offers a diplomatic foundation.

Why this moment could matter now is tied to political incentives. After midterm election losses, Trump may seek a defining foreign-policy achievement. Putin and Xi, meanwhile, face their own strategic calculations regarding cost, security, and global standing. The authors propose a concrete path: Washington and Moscow would reduce their arsenals to roughly 600 warheads—approximately China’s current level—while Beijing halts its expansion.

That first phase would be followed by broader negotiations involving all nine nuclear-armed states, culminating in adherence to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and a timeline for total elimination. The writers suggest the process could conclude before the centennial of the United Nations and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Key Takeaways

  • A potential Trump-Putin-Xi meeting at the 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen has reopened discussion about major nuclear arms reductions.
  • The authors compare the opportunity to the 1986 Reykjavik summit, where Reagan and Gorbachev nearly agreed to abolish nuclear weapons.
  • Trump, Putin, and Xi have all made past statements supporting disarmament in principle, though each faces domestic and strategic obstacles.
  • The proposed plan calls for the U.S. and Russia to cut arsenals to around 600 warheads, with China freezing its buildup during an initial trust-building stage.
  • The ultimate goal involves all nine nuclear powers joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and eliminating stockpiles within a decade.
  • Success would require ending conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, renewing commitment to the UN Charter, and sustained high-level diplomacy.

Conclusion

The piece closes with a call for political courage. Citing John F. Kennedy’s 1963 American University address, the authors argue that because humanity created the nuclear dilemma, humanity can also resolve it. They caution against dismissing the possibility simply because the leaders involved are controversial or unpredictable.

Whether a Shenzhen meeting produces concrete disarmament talks remains uncertain. Yet the authors contend that if Reagan and Gorbachev came very close to ending the nuclear age forty years ago, a similar breakthrough cannot be dismissed today. The nuclear age, they write, should not be allowed to reach its hundredth year.